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INTRODUCTION  
 
Jacques Derrida—‘un résau de traces’ 
 
Writing is not speaking. 
Abdelkebir Khatibi 
 
“He was born, he thought, and he died.” And all the rest is pure anecdote. 
Jacques Derrida 
 
“Now that deconstruction and interest in Derrida is largely moribund, what do you 
see the point of your work being?” 
 Impure anecdote 
 
I  Confessions 
 
Two ‘responses’, then, with which we begin. 
 
I began, almost forty years ago, with a reflection on writing, on text. That which 
mattered to me from the beginning—although I would become a ‘philosopher’ by 
profession—was literary writing. What is it to write, I asked myself. What is that 
takes place when one writes? In order to respond, I had to broaden the concept of 
text and try to justify this extension. “There is no outside text” does not want to say 
that all is…writing, but that any experience is structured like a network of traces, 
which return to something other than themselves. In other words, there is no 
present which is not constituted without reference to another time, another 
present. The present-trace. It traces and is traced. (JD) 
What's the most widely held misconception about you and your work? 
That I'm a skeptical nihilist who doesn't believe in anything, who thinks nothing 
has meaning, and text has no meaning. That's stupid and utterly wrong, and only 
people who haven't read me say this. It's a misreading of my work that began 35 
years ago, and it's difficult to destroy. I never said everything is linguistic and we're 
enclosed in language…Anyone who reads my work with attention understands that 
I insist on affirmation and faith, and that I'm full of respect for the texts I read. 
(TA) 
 
You open a book, and it begins with two comments extracted from interviews. A voice 
appears to be here, even though the person speaking them is not, obviously. Writing arrives before 
the voice. By virtue of the text, there are the traces of that person’s words in that person’s absence. 
The present moment is divided. It can never be present fully, even the present in which I write or 
in which you read. When I wrote here, there are traces, and the present moment, each of those 
moments was a present, now irrecuperable. The present moment of writing, always changing, 
comes to pass, and in that inscription the present consigns, countersigns itself to its own 
displacement. It is as ifi the present were marked by the appearance of the letters in the 
nanoseconds after I have pressed the keys and the cursor advances, fractionally ahead. But each 
and every present moment that I am describing, which I am describing through inscription even as 
I inscribe the description, is in process, having become traced in the words you are reading, traced 
by the traces of that present turning and returning to some other moment than that present. This 
description of what takes place here is not limited to the act of writing in any narrow sense. It is 
what structures the experience of, well everything.  
To restrict that ‘everything’ with an example, a single instance on which we will risk the 
implication of everything, reflect on your reading of this passage.  
First: who is the ‘you’ to whom I refer? It implies an unknowable number of yous, of 
readers, which number cannot be calculated. One cannot assume a totality or finite number of 
readers or, for that matter, readings.  
Second: for every you who reads, there is a now, a present moment of reading. The 
movement and network of traces informing the times of writing also marks and is remarked by the 
experience of reading. By extension, the network of traces by which a present folds back onto, 
echoes with, or returns to some other place informs every experience of the present on the part of 
a subject.  
Third: the present moment of a reading is incalculable. You will continue to read even 
when you close the book, when you put it down to do something else.  
Fourth: though you are reading in a present the traces of the present in which these words 
are / were written can never be present as such, even though I am  / was writing in the so-called 
present tense. That is a present without presence, and is only simulated by the ‘present-trace’, the 
trace of the present that is traced and which traces.  
Fifth, neither you nor I are present at the moment when the ‘voice’, which is reported 
above by the collection of traces, and therefore writing, text, spoke those words. Jacques Derrida is 
not present. His words are remainders. They remain—to be read. They are reminders, every time 
one reads, that he is not present, that he can no longer be present.  
And the same goes for the words I write. Written at a different time than the interviews 
cited above, and yet another time than those other times of transcription, printing, and all the 
times of reading, what I will call ‘my’ words (with a deliberate naïveté) are here/there in my 
absence. My own present moment is thus inscribed in, as it inscribes itself into, that return of the 
traces to some other present than the present which this is (7:23 am, Tuesday, 8th August, 2006). I 
will therefore have been absent, always already absent if you are reading this. There is no ‘I’ here. It 
is as if I were dead. It is always as if one is reading ‘the traces of one who has just died…this was 
what Derrida meant by writing…this terrible Unheimlichkeit [uncanniness]…there and not there. Still 
here and, already, not here: now here and nowhere’ (Gaston 2006, 1). To echo a remark from 
above, this does not mean to say that everything is linguistic. This should be clear, let’s be clear 
about this. But not everything is clear. Otherwise, we wouldn’t have to repeat the point. It hasn’t 
been clear—ever. Had it been clear to those whose misreadings are stupid and utterly wrong, then 
not only would Derrida not have had to say what he says/said in the interviews above and in 
numerous other places, there would also be no need for books such as this ‘introductory guide’. 
Although nothing could be clearer than the two reflective commentaries I cite above, we’re not in 
the clear yet. 
 
II Autobiothanatography 
 
Jacques Derrida: this name has become virtually synonymous in some circles with the word 
‘deconstruction’. Derrida’s publications have had an enormous, though not uncontested influence 
on literary study and other academic disciplines in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
particularly since the 1970s. Derrida first came to the attention of the English-speaking academic 
world in 1966, following a paper presented at a colloquium at Johns Hopkins University. The 
following year, 1967, Derrida published three books subsequently translated as Of Grammatology 
(1976), Speech and Phenomena (1973), and Writing and Difference (1978). These were followed in 
1972 by three more in French, translated as Dissemination, Margins of Philosophy, and Positions, 
securing Derrida’s influence. This influence has subsequently spread beyond the study of literature 
and literary theory, to produce effects in film and cultural studies, in legal theory, in the study and 
theory of architecture, and more generally throughout the humanities and social sciences. A 
professor of Philosophy (he once remarked that he was not ‘happy with the term philosopher’; DO, 
140) Derrida’s writing has, ironically, though perhaps not surprisingly, met with the greatest 
resistance—sometimes, more simply, a lack of comprehension—in philosophy departments 
throughout British and North American universities, and in French intellectual and political 
circles. 
Derrida’s own philosophical work began with a study in the mid-1950s of German 
philosopher Edmund Husserl, before turning to detailed, painstaking analyses of many of the 
canonical philosophers, from Plato onwards. His published works have also considered a broad 
range of literary writers, including Shakespeare, Joyce, Paul Celan, Jean Genet, and Francis Ponge. 
Glas, a book presented in two columns, presents discussions side-by-side of Genet and Hegel. 
There is also discernible to some in Derrida’s writing a turn, from the 1980s at least, to more 
overtly stated questions of ethics and politics, considerations of the identity of Europe, matters of 
globalization and its implications, the meaning of democracy, the future of the humanities and the 
role of the university in today’s society. His work has also engaged in a sustained fashion with the 
discourse of psychoanalysis, particularly the work of Sigmund Freud, in numerous essays, The Post 
Card: from Socrates to Freud and Beyond, (1987) and Archive Fever (1995). His writing is rigorously 
informed, simultaneously, by the great philosophical exegetical traditions and an experimental, 
playful exploration of tonalities and voices, and an interest in what he has called the ‘non-verbal 
within the verbal’. 
However, it is impossible to sum up Derrida’s work. This is in small part because his 
published output in both French and in translation is so huge. In 1992, an annotated primary and 
secondary bibliography was published, which lists over 40 books in French alone, between 1967 
and 1991. Not counting chapters in books or interviews, there were over 180 articles published 
during the same period. More significantly however, it is impossible to offer a summary because, 
despite views put forward in encyclopaedias, textbooks on literary theory, and in many classrooms, 
Derrida has neither articulated nor proposed a single theory or philosophical position. Rather, 
what can be said of his work is that each publication is a singular demonstration of a patient 
response to the contours, rhythms, and turns of the subject being addressed. This being the case, it 
has to be recognised, if one attempts to read Derrida faithfully, that his writing necessarily 
transforms itself according to the given interest. As Derrida puts it ‘“good” literary criticism, the 
only worthwhile kind, implies an act, a literary signature or counter-signature, an inventive 
experience of language, in language, an inscription of the act of reading in the field of the text that 
is read’ (SICL, 52). Because of this singular attentiveness on Derrida’s part, it is therefore 
impossible to elevate the specificity of each analysis to the level of certain general rules.  
 This has led to a somewhat odd reception of Derrida’s work. The initial phase of reception 
in both the UK and the USA was marked either by outright hostility, where Derrida had been 
characterised as an obscurantist charlatan, or by an attempt to extract from his writings certain 
repeatable practices, thereby producing a theory of analysis from his work, and it is this process 
that has come to be termed ‘deconstruction’, of which, as you will see in the first chapter, Derrida 
is repeatedly wary, marking a distance between himself and such methodological appropriations. It 
should not be thought however that Derrida has been simply misunderstood. Indeed, he has a 
number of faithful, careful readers. 
Originally named Jackie by his mother, Georgette Derrida (née Safar), Jacques Derrida was 
born in El-Biar, Algeria, July 15, 1930. Born into a Jewish family who, under the Crémieux decree 
of 1875 were ‘indigenous jews’ of Algeria without rights to French citizenship, Derrida grew up in 
French colonial Algeria, where, as a Jew and Algerian, he was doubly discriminated against. In 
1940, Derrida experienced anti-Semitic discrimination at primary school as a result of the 
regulations of the Pétain regime, where, because he was Jewish, he was not permitted to raise the 
French flag, an honour usually given to the top pupil in the class. In 1942, one year after starting 
school at the Lycée de Ben Aknoun, Derrida was expelled. Being sent to another school, the Lycée 
Emile-Maupas at which Jewish teachers barred from the public system worked, Derrida spent much 
of the year until spring 1943 secretly not attending school. Following the Allied landing and a 
period of dismantling Pétainist control by the De Gaulle-Giraud government, Derrida returned for 
four years to the Lycée de Ben Aknoun. A poor student, he preferred to play football, and was a 
voracious reader, reading at the time figures such as Rousseau and Nietzsche, who would later 
become significant in his writing and thought. 
In 1948, Derrida passed his baccalauréat, at the Lycée Gauthier, Algiers, where he read for 
the first time Jean-Paul Sartre and Henri Bergson. Between 1949 and 1952, he was a boarder at the 
Lycée Louis-le-Grand, Paris. His first exposure to Paris and mainland France, Derrida’s experience 
as a student was a difficult one, marked by poor physical and mental health, particularly in 1951-
52. Having failed the entrance exam to the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1950, he was 
subsequently admitted in 1952, when he came to know and work with Marxist philosopher Louis 
Althusser, who was to remain a close acquaintance for nearly two decades. In 1957, following 
success in the agrégation, the exam which qualifies teachers of higher education, Derrida travelled 
to the USA for the first time, to study unpublished work by Edmund Husserl at Harvard 
University. In June of that year, he married Marguerite Aucouturier, in Boston, Massachusetts. 
Conscripted in1957 for two years by the French army during the Algerian War, Derrida 
served not in the military but as a French and English teacher. This was followed by a teaching 
position for four years at the Sorbonne, during which time Derrida met with French historian of 
ideas Michel Foucault and novelist Philippe Sollers, also publishing his first articles in the radical 
journal founded by Sollers, Tel Quel, an association maintained until 1972, when Derrida made an 
unequivocal break. In 1964, he was invited by Althusser and philosopher Jean Hyppolite to teach 
at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, where Derrida remained for twenty years. Though responsible 
for organizing the first general assembly at the Ecole Normale during May 1968, and taking part in 
marches, Derrida did not give his support whole-heartedly to particular aspects of the protests. 
Travelling frequently to conferences and colloquia from 1968 onwards, Derrida was 
offered a visiting professorship in 1975 at Yale University, a post he held until 1986, when, along 
with Yale Colleague and literary critic J. Hillis Miller, he accepted another visiting post at the 
University of California, Irvine. At Yale, Derrida was identified in the media, along with Miller, 
Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, and Paul de Man, as belonging to the so-called Yale School of 
Deconstruction. In truth, no such school existed, but was invented by media misperception and a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the critical work that Derrida, de Man, and Miller were each, in 
their own fashion, pursuing. Such work was mistakenly given the name of ‘deconstruction’, as 
though this were a method, a programmatic form of analysis, or, indeed, a school of thought. 
Back in France, Derrida and other philosophers organised at the Sorbonne the Estates 
General of Philosophy in 1979, while the following year he defended his Thèse d’Etat. Derrida had 
never formally completed doctoral work and the examination in 1980 addressed his published 
work. In 1981, Derrida helped organize the Jan Hus Association, aimed at aiding persecuted Czech 
intellectuals. While visiting Prague in the same year, to organise a secret seminar, he was arrested 
on the pretext of producing and trafficking drugs. As a result of François Mitterand’s involvement, 
amongst other measures, Derrida was released and expelled from Czechoslovakia. Another 
significant organizational work took place in 1983, the founding of the Collège international de 
philosophie in Paris. Derrida was its first director, whilst also being involved in the Foundation 
against Apartheid, and the organization of an exhibition, ‘Art against Apartheid’. In this year, 
Derrida was also elected as directeur d’études at the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences socials, 
Paris, a position he held until his official ‘retirement’ at the age of 67. 
Jacques Derrida continued to travel extensively, lecturing, taking up visiting posts, 
participating in conferences, writing and publishing. Two moments of public notoriety attached 
themselves to Derrida, which speak more of both the public and academic misunderstanding of 
his work, than they do of Derrida himself. The first, coming in 1987, became known as the ‘Paul 
de Man Affair’. A friend and colleague of Derrida’s at Yale, de Man died unexpectedly in 1983. 
Subsequently, a young Belgian researcher, Ortwin de Graef, discovered some articles written for 
the right-wing paper Le Soir by de Man, while a young man in Belgium during the Second World 
War. A couple of articles on national literatures expressed anti-Semitic sentiments. While none of 
de Man’s subsequent publications show any traces of such thought, the discovery of the articles 
became the excuse for a media feeding frenzy, attacking so-called deconstruction and its 
‘practitioners’, for being nihilist, irresponsible, aimed at destroying the humanities and even, in 
one or two extreme cases, fascistic. Few if any of these attacks adhered to even a basic reporting of 
the facts, and showed neither any sign of understanding nor any real willingness to read either de 
Man or Derrida’s work whatsoever. Equally fuelled by misunderstanding and not reading was the 
1992 ‘Cambridge Affair’, in which, in an extremely rare occurrence, a small number of Cambridge 
dons started a campaign against the awarding of an honorary degree to Derrida. Several months of 
agitation led to letters of objection being printed in the national and international press. 
Eventually however, the vote went strongly in Derrida’s favour, and the doctorate honoris causa was 
awarded on June 11, 1992. 
These two incidents are symptomatic of the non-reception of Derrida, both inside the 
university and at large. They typically highlight the ways in which an author and his works can be 
received without ever having been read. This is ironic inasmuch as all of Derrida’s life and work, 
regardless of subject, has been devoted to careful, diligent, patient acts of reading and not to 
hurried or journalistic analysis or what Derrida has referred to as ‘reading on the fly’. However, as 
with so many commonplace terms, such as writing or text, Derrida has expanded radically our 
notion of the meaning of such words, and reading is no exception. In an interview, Derrida 
claimed never to have ‘read’ particular authors. This was not some coy gesture on Derrida’s part 
but is, rather, typical of Derrida’s insistence on how one addresses and analyses any textual form. 
For Derrida, the notion of ‘reading’ is one that implies a comprehensive commentary on a poem 
or novel in its entirety, an achievement which is impossible. One can never finally read or claim to 
have read a text in its entirety. One must continue carefully to read and re-read, because the act of 
reading is always marked by an ever-receding horizon. It is always to come. 
 
III This, therefore, will not have been ‘ Jacques Derrida’ 
 
Where should one start, though, with the text signed Jacques Derrida? A biography tells us little or 
nothing of the work. Certainly, the text cannot be understood only by the biography or restricted 
to that life as if it were the first and final context. Wherever the biography marks itself on the text, 
the one is not the same as the other, and biography is not a replacement for close, patient reading 
of a paragraph or two.  It is a narrative device sustained by the authority of raw facts and dates 
designed to stabilize the reception of an image, co-mingling public and private, as though in doing 
so one could provide a way into, or a substitute for, the writing of the person being discussed.  
If one is to speak to the question of how Derrida reads and writes reading, we ought to 
begin by understanding that the question for the reader of Derrida is one of inventing ways to 
disrupt received narratives. Let us therefore conclude this introduction by turning towards the 
interest of the next chapter, deconstruction. The received narratives concerning this word amount 
to, or include, statements concerning its existence as a form of literary theory. It is a method of 
analysis, a school of thought, a programme for reading according to an interdisciplinary amalgam 
of linguistic, philosophical, and psychoanalytic discourses. Regarding the origins of 
deconstruction, the received and institutional narratives strive to separate the philosophical from 
the linguistic or literary and stake claims in philosophy rather than language. As you can see 
though, if you reflect on the first of Derrida’s two responses cited at the beginning of this 
introduction, there is no simple origin, no single source from which everything can be traced. 
Instead, what takes place between discourses and remains to be read as the motion, if you will, of 
the other, that gives to any discourse or institution its determining features whilst remaining other 
than, and heterogeneous to, those elements—this is what interests Derrida: that which is 
irrecuperable to any homogeneous order and yet which supports it, causing the identity, meaning, 
discourse, institution or ontology to take place.  
As you will see in the following chapter, representations of deconstruction as method, 
school of thought, programme and so on, are misrepresentations for the reasons explained there. 
Consider, instead though, the following commentary on deconstruction. Deconstruction, Derrida 
argues, ‘not only teaches us to read literature more thoroughly by attending to it as 
language…through a complex play of signifying traces;’  
 
it also enables us to interrogate the covert philosophical and political 
presuppositions of institutionalized critical methods which generally govern our 
reading of a text. There is in deconstruction something which challenges every 
teaching institution. (DO, 155)  
 
There is much more to this quotation, and I shall consider it in the next chapter. For now 
however, notice how Derrida, in speaking of a provisional definition for ‘deconstruction’, 
emphasizes equally language, philosophy and politics, and by way of a further orientation a 
challenge to ‘every teaching institution’. By institution, Derrida refers not only to the material 
manifestations such as universities, but also to the operative and normative discourses, from 
administrative protocols and procedures, to the discourses and disciplines, to which the various 
discourses pertain. 
The question is therefore one of inventing new translations for reading and writing within 
the institutional,  operating on and transforming them from within. Derrida has pursued 
repeatedly the effective invention or translations of such concepts. (Invention will be considered in 
the final chapter.) His purpose has been to ‘eviscerate and re-assemble them in difference, 
interrupt[ing] the received programs of perception, interpretation, and experience—and in the 
process of altering this past…hold open the space for the arrival of the unprecedented event, of a 
virtual or alternative “future” to those [that are] programmatically foreseeable’ (Cohen 2001, 2). To 
this extent that a number of academics who claim to read Derrida have not recognized this means 
the broad contexts of Derrida’s misreception have remained largely static. Insisting on 
transforming Derrida’s patient acts of reading into methods, and circling around the same 
arguments concerned with the origins or provenance of Derrida’s thought in the academic context, 
arguments have remained resolutely unattentive to the aporia, the gaps or impasses in their own 
structures. They have succumbed to the symptomatic procedures by which they seek to identify 
both Derrida and deconstruction. 
 If we can summarize Derrida in any way then, it is as the thinker of this aporia, as a thinker 
of the space, the gap, the deviation or swerve within any ontology, meaning or identity. His work 
repeatedly stresses that one can ‘only respond by tracing the gap’ and the ‘histories of the gap’ 
(Gaston 2006, vii). The gap is necessary to thought. It takes place as a place and as the possibility of 
a between; unbridgeable in itself it nonetheless opens itself, within a discourse, within an 
institution, within cultures and politics, in order to give place to the possibility of an other taking 
place, the unprecedented event by which transformation, translation, interruption have their 
chances. Reading after Derrida one must fall, be precipitated headlong into the gap, so as to avoid 
reappropriation (Gaston 2005, 97) so as to leave oneself naked and open to the unforeseeable, and 
thus, in taking a chance on the precipitate decision.  
It is in thinking the gap, each time in the patient reading or invention of a singular text, 
institution or situation, that Derrida avoids reappropriation, recuperation, not least in terms of 
‘theory’ or programme. There is therefore never an objective position or ‘metaposition’ (Fynsk 
2003, x). Instead, Derrida enters into an engaged, committed relation to the other by which his 
reading is guided resistant to any ready-made position. There is to his work an aspect of 
‘fundamental research’ insisting, demonstrating repeatedly, tirelessly, the gap or unthought within 
any system, as this enables an interrogation of the ‘structure of representation’ (Fynsk 2003, x) by 
which the system, model, or institution maintains itself. In this fashion, in endlessly inventive and 
interruptive ways, Derrida opens the textual network of traces and the history of its silences, 
omissions, and absences, to an unexpected event of reading, and so to other readings to come, 
beyond the expectation of any programmable or predictable future or horizon.  
Thinking without programme from within that structure, and yet with a smiling and 
affirmative resistance to the systems he inhabits, Derrida achieves a different ‘level of reflection’, 
which in any number of examples had previously been unavailable. In its exposure of the limits of 
any ‘language’, theory, or philosophy, Derrida may seem to move to ‘a new level of complexity or 
difficulty…[involving, for some] an irritating complication’ (Fynsk 2003, xiii). However, for others, 
he offers profound possibilities for the transformation of the ‘realities at stake’ undergirding any 
practice through ‘sustained attention to the grain of thought in its textual elaboration’ (Fynsk 
2003, xiii). Every text by Derrida is a profession of faith in the undecidable and what is to come. It 
entails a ‘labyrinthine movement’, a ‘performative and at times vertiginous mobility’, the ‘explosive 
variants and viral elaborations’ of which are the hallmarks of a movement and a spacing in pursuit 
of an ‘irreducible element’ (Cohen 2001, 6). It is through an attention to such movement, to 
irreducible elements such as the performative, writing and singularity, literature, representation and 
being, amongst other things, that we will speak. 
 
